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U.S.-ROK Security Treaty: Another Half Century? 
Edward A. Olsen 
The next two years shall mark a watershed in U.S.-Korea 
security relations. In October of 2003 and November of 2004 the United 
States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) will observe the fiftieth 
anniversary of the signing of their Mutual Defense Treaty (October 1, 
1953) and the date the treaty entered into force (November 17, 1954). 
Each shall formally represent a half century milestone in U.S.-ROK 
security relations . As a practical matter that strategic relationship 
obviously stretches further back in history. A modest case can be made 
for the beginning dating back to the U.S . military's occupation of 
liberated southern Korea after the defeat of Japan in World War Two. 
An early formal tie can be linked to the creation of the ROK via May 
1948 United Nations-backed elections that yielded a U .S.-ROK state-to-
state military relationship. ' A profound bilateral security relationship 
dates from the 1950-53 Korean War time frame giving both allies strong 
memories sealed in blood.1 Using any of these dates, the United States 
and South Korea already have surpassed the half century mark in their 
bilateral security relationship. Nonetheless, the upcoming anniversary 
For insights into the military dynamics of those periods. see: E. Grant Meade, American 
Military Government in Korea, (New York: Kings Crown Press, 1951), and Robert K. 
Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in War and Peace, (Washington, DC : 
Department of Army, Office of Military History, 1962). 
2 For senior American and South Korean generals' perspectives on that war and its 
legacy, see: Mathew B. Ridgway, The Korean War, (New York : Doubleday & Co., 
1967), J. Lawton Collins, War In Peacetime, The History and Lessons oj Korea, 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1969), and Paik Sun-yup, From Pusan To Panmunjom, 
(Washington, DC: Brassey 's, 1992' 
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dates for the formal Mutual Security Treaty undoubtedly and deservedly 
will be the focus of major bilateral attention. 
The five decades of U.S.-ROK security relations have been the 
subject of countless press and academic articles and numerous books over 
the years. Undoubtedly the fiftieth anniversary of the treaty will be the 
occasion for additional historical studies. Although some of the scholarly 
attention to that historical legacy shall be drawn upon here, the focus of 
this analysis is the future and how planning for future conditions has been 
addressed within the alliance . As the title implies, it will explore the 
prospects for another half century -- examining both the likelihood and 
desirability of extending the alliance, based on the Mutual Security Treaty, 
to the full century mark with its anniversary in 2053-2054. It also will 
assess alternatives to a second fifty years of the same type alliance . 
As important as the Mutual Security Treaty is to U.S.-ROK 
overall relations, and military-to-military ties, not many Americans or 
South Koreans are familiar with its text.' The text's specific provisions 
are rarely the subject of scholarly attention.~ Nor do many Americans 
pay much attention to the ways in which the U.S . decision to participate 
in the Korean War, that led to the creation of the Mutual Security Treaty, 
was the focus of a heated debate among Americans about the most 
appropriate foreign and defense policies the United States should pursue -
- and the consequent impact upon the U.S. role in the still young Cold 
War. 5 Virtually no attention is paid to the sparse nature of contemporary 
3 It is available for perusal in : U.S. Department of State. u.s. Treaties and Other 
International Agreements. Vol. 5. Part 3. (Washington. DC: Government Printing Office. 
1954), pp. 2368-2376. 
4 For examples of critical insights into its provisions and limitations. see: Claude A. Buss. 
The United States and The Republic of Korea. Background for Policy. (Stanford : 
Hoover Institution Press, 1982). Callum A. MacDonald, Korea. The War Before 
Vietnam, (New York: The Free Press. 1986), and Doug Bandow, Tripwire. Korea and 
u.s. Foreign Policy in a Changed "forld, (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 1996). 
5 For important assessments of that impact, see: Rosemary A. Foot, The Wrong War: 
American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict. 1950-1953, (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1985), and Murray N. Rothbard. "The Foreign Policy of the 
Old Right." Journal of Libertarian Studies. Vol. 2. No. I. 1978, pp. 85-96 
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U.S . media coverage of the treaty 's signing or launching. 6 Having 
become I entangled in the inter-Korean struggle as part of the formative 
phase of an expanding Cold War, the United States' stake in the results of 
that war became imbedded in U.S . policy. As important as the debate 
among policymakers and politicians had been at the war's ouset, there 
was little popular attention paid to the reasons why the United States 
intensified its strategic commitments after the truce was achieved . 
These geopolitical obligations evolved from the altered Cold War context 
as though they were inevitable. 
It is important to note the nuances of the setting in which the 
Mutual Security Treaty came into being. After the Korean Conflict's 
controversial truce was achieved through prolonged negotiations and 
signed on July27, 1953 / the Syngman Rhee government was profoundly 
unhappy about this turn of events and did its utmost to derail the results 
of the process . The formal security treaty between the United States and 
South Korea was, in part, a device to reassure the Rhee government about 
the United States ' continuing resolve on behalf of the ROK as well as 
means to restrain its ally 's willingness to reignite the war.8 It is also 
important to note the broader context of the 1953, post-Korean War, U.S.-
6 For t:arly scholarly coverage of the truce process and its aftermath. st:e: Leland M. 
Goodrich. Korea. A Stlll~V of L'.S. Policy in the ["nited Nations. (New York: Council on 
Foreign Rel ations. 1956). Kyung Cho Chung. Korea Tomorrow. Land of the .'vIorning 
Calm. (New York: The Macmill an Company. 1956). Carl Berger. The Korea Knot. rI 
:Ifilitary-Political HistOlY. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 195711964). 
(revised edition): and William H. Vatcher. Jr.. Panmllnjom: The Story of the Korean 
Military rlrmistice Negotiations. (New York: Frt:derick A. Praeger. Inc., 1958). For 
contemporary press coverage of the signing. see: anonymous. "Dulles Signs Pact With 
South Korea:' The New York Times. October 2. 1953. p. I. in which Secretary of States 
Dulks. after signing the treaty. said it is "another link in the collective security of the 
free nations of the Pacific." 
7 For insights into U.S. involvement in that convoluted process. see: Rosemary Foot, A 
Substitllte for VictOlY: The Politics of Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Talks. 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1985). 
8 For historical analyses of that dynamic. see: Harold M. Vinacke. A History of the Far 
East in ,l,40dern Times. (New York: Appleton-Century-Croft. Inc ., 1959), and Claude A. 
Buss. Asia in The Modern World. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1964). 
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ROK security treaty. In the preface portion of the treaty, prior to the 
specifics of Articles I-VI, both parties declared: 
Desiring further to strengthen their efforts for collective defense 
for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a 
more comprehensive and effective system of regional security in the 
Pacific area9 (emphasis added) 
This strongly indicates that this · treaty was intended to be an interim 
arrangement. That larger objective was clear in the Eisenhower 
administration 's efforts to build a lasting multilateral security network in 
Southeast Asia -- via the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) -
- that did not succeed. lo Had those sub-regional efforts succeeded, they 
likely would have been replicated throughout the other sub-regions of 
Asia -- including Northeast Asia -- and become the components of a pan-
Asian regional security system analogous to the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO). Obviously that never materialized , creating 
circumstances in which the United States assembled a hodgepodge of 
bilateral security and basing arrangements whose linkages were primarily 
through the U.S . nexus. I I 
These developments transformed the premises behind the U .S .-
ROK Mutual Security Treaty, overshadowed its interim qualities, and 
made it part of an evolving theme in the Cold War. Instead of becoming a 
building block within a larger regional multilateral security structure, the 
U.S .-ROK alliance became one of a set of U.S. bilateral security 
relationships bolstering the U.S.-led cause in the Cold War. The United 
States and the Soviet Union utilized their respective networks of strategic 
9 U.S. Treaties, op. cit., p. 2371. 
\0 For assessments of that attempt and U.S. motives, see: Leszek Buszynski . SEATO. The 
Faillire of an Alliance Strategy, (Singapore: Singapore University Press. 1983). Robert 
Divine, Eisenhower and the Cold War, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981). and 
Richard A. Melanson and David Mayers, eds., Reevaluating Eisenhower.' American 
Foreign Policy in the 1 950s. (Urbana: University oflllinois Press, 1987). 
II For an overall assessment of those strategic circumstances, see: Robert E. Harkavy, 
Great Power Competition for Overseas Bases: The Geopolitics of Access Diplomacy. 
(New York: Pergarnon Press. 1982). 
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outposts for their global competition. In turn, those outposts were 
integrated into a form of strategic bilateral dependence by subordinate 
states rather than regional interdependence among partners. In terms of 
U.S.-ROK relations the post-Korean War bond was simultaneously far 
deeper than it had been prior to the war as well as far more of a client 
state affiliation. In short, there was an ambivalent level of intensity and 
expedience. 
For present purposes what is most important about the initial 
events and their contextual setting is the assurance they provide in noting 
with confidence that there was no expectation as of 1953-54 that the 
arrangements put into place would remain intact for one hundred years. 
One can have almost the same level of confidence that most observers as 
of 1953-54 were not thinking in terms of the mutual treaty obligations 
persisting into the 21 st century. Yet, events caused the security relationship to 
endure and in many respects flourish throughout the Cold War and into 
the early post-Cold War era. As the 21 st century approached, many 
analysts during the last decade of the 20th century were optimistic that 
the U.S .-ROK security relationship would be perpetuated on a track that 
embodied basic continuity blended with innovative adaptations to 
changing circumstances .12 Some analysts extended that perspective to 
include U.S. security ties with a reunified Korea .113 Such views clearly 
represent the mainstream in both the United States and South Korea. 
Nonetheless, there has been a long term debate within the United States 
about both the desirable level of a U.S . security commitment to South 
Korea and about the criteria that would warrant modifying or terminating 
12 For significant examples. see: Jonathan D. Pollack and Cha Young-koo, A New 
Alliance lor the Next Century: The Future 0/ U.S-Korean Security Cooperation, (Santa 
Monica: RAND. 1995), Kwak Tae-hwan and Thomas L. Wilborn, eds .. The US- ROK 
Alliance in Transition. (Seoul : IFES. Kyungnam University. 1996), and Ralph Cossa. 
US-Korea-Japan Relations: Building Toward a .. Virtual Alliance ". (Washington, DC: 
CSIS. 1999). 
13 See: Jonathan D. Pollack and Chung Min Lee, Preparing /01' Korean Unification; 
Scenarios & Implications. (Santa Monica: RAND. 1999). and Robert Dujarric, Korean 
Unification and After: The Challenge/or U.S Strategy, (Indianapolis: Hudson Institute. 
2000). 
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that commitment. I '; 
The upcoming commemoration of the anniversaries will provide 
a profound opportunity for all sides in the low key U.S. debate over "how 
much" and "how long" is appropriate for the future to reinvigorate their 
discussion . That debate also should be trans-Pacific in scope, between 
Americans and their South Korean counterparts within the alliance. 
Both parties should contemplate the future of their respective national 
interests in the alliance as well as the impact Korean national unification 
could have on their security policies. 15 There are a number of key issues 
that should be addressed as part of that evaluation. How important is the 
security relationship today? Will its importance grow or shrink? What 
factors will influence its importance? All of these shall be addressed here 
with the intent of helping to clarify the terms of the debate for both 
Americans and Koreans. 
The importance attached to the U.S.-ROK Mutual Security 
Treaty has evolved in a dramatic fashion over the years. At the outset 
there was virtually nothing meaningful embodied by both sides' use of 
the word "mutual." In terms of a South Korean commitment to defend 
U.S. territory, much less any U.S. need for such a commitment by the 
ROK, there was literally nothing "mutual" about the treaty. That is as true 
in 2002 as it was in 1953-54. On the other hand, acknowledging this 
controversial aspect of the treaty does not sl ight South Korea because the 
same observation applies to nearly all the United States' security 
arrangements with other countries. Notwithstanding claims to the 
14 For examples from both the liberal and conservative ends of the analytical spectrum. 
see: Earl C Ravenal. "The Way Out of Korea." Inqlliry. December 5. 1977. pp. 15-18: 
Melvyn Krause. " It' s Time for U.S. Troops to Leave Korea. " The Christian Science 
Monitor, August 24. 1987, p. 13: Doug Bandow. op. cit.. and his '·Korea. The Case for 
Disengagement." Policy Analysis, No. 96. (Washington. DC: Cato Institute. December 
8. 1987). Stephen Goose. "U.S. Forces in Korea : Assessing a Reduction" in Ted Galen 
Carpenter, ed .. Collective Defense or Strategic Independence .'} Alternative Strategies 
for the Flllllre, (Washington, DC: Cato Institute. 1989), and Selig Harrison. "Time to 
Leave Korea~", Foreign Affairs. March/April 2001. pp. 62-79. 
15 The author explores the latter theme in greater detail in his. Toward Normali::ing C.S.-
Korea Relations; In Due Course .? (Boulder : Lynne Rienner Publishers. 2002). 
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contrary throughout the Cold War or during the current war on terrorism, 
the United States' perceived need for other countries to defend the United 
States ranges from negligible to non-existent. 16 Nonetheless. it does not 
diminish the ways in which a variety of countries -- including South 
Korea -- have been able to address the "mutual" facets of their security 
ties with the United States by helping the United States cope with threats 
to common interests not directly linked to U.S. homeland security. 
Aside from the obvious utility of South Korea's strategic 
assistance in helping to stabilize Asia by coping with North Korea's 
capabilities throughout the Cold War and post-Cold War years, the ROK 
also lent a major military hand during the Vietnam War. South Korean 
force levels in Vietnam peaked at 50,000 and cumulatively almost 
300,000 served under combat conditions with over 3,000 killed. This 
demonstrated Seoul's commitment to a broader brand of mutual 
security.17 To be sure. South Korea also benefited from this effort in 
major ways by enhancing U.S. appreciation for the ROK as an ally, 
cultivating economic opportunities that bolstered South Korea at home 
and internationally, and influencing the United States' readiness to 
rearrange its priorities within Asia. On balance, therefore, as much as 
South Korea was traumatized by the United States' strategic setbacks in 
Indochina, and the resulting Vietnam syndrome's impact on American 
enthusiasm for existing U.S. strategic commitments, there is ample 
reason to perceive the U.S.-ROK security commitment's regional 
mutuality as becoming more thorough going as a result of experiencing 
this maturation process. 
16 The author cxplores that facet of U. S. grand strategy from a libertari an perspective in 
his. Us. National Def ense for the 21st Century: The Grand bit Strategy. (London: 
Frank Cass Publishers. 2002) . 
17 For useful insights into South Korea's readiness to participate in that war and the 
consequences of doing so. see : Claude A. Buss. The United States and the Republic of 
Korea. op. cit.. Han Sung-joo. " South Korea 's Participation in the Vietnam Conflict: An 
Analysis of the U.S .-Korean Alliance: ' Orbis. Winter 1978, pp. 893-912: and George 
McT. Kahin. Intervention. How America Became Inm/ved in lietnam. (New York : 
Alfred A. KnopL 1986) 
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As the Cold War evolved during the Reagan years, South Korea 
played a steadfast role as a regional security partner for the United 
States. 18 South Korea reinforced that role through its efforts on the 
foreign policy front to diversifY its economic and geopolitical interdependence. 
These steps were motivated by post-OPEC oil crisis economic desires to 
instill greater systemic support analogous to Japan's approach to 
"comprehensive security,"19 by a desire to learn from West Germany's 
ostpolitik model through adaptation to Seoul's nordpolitik overtures to 
countries not in the U.S .-led camp of the Cold War, and by a readiness to 
experiment with a pre-Olympics brand of sports diplomacy designed to 
broaden South Korea's roles in the international community."o Despite all 
these efforts to diversify the ROK's network of contacts around the world, 
Seoul very clearly was intent upon preserving the foundation for its 
innovative external policies in the form of the bilateral U .S.-ROK mutual 
security alliance rooted in the Cold War. In short, as much as South 
Korea 's policies effectively prepared it for the end of the Cold War, the 
ROK was not consciously planning for that end game any more than any 
other country whose security policies had been predicated on Cold War 
continuity."1 
18 For representative treatm.:nts of that era. see: Ralph N. Clough . Emhallied /(or('o : The 
Rivahy jar Infernational SlIpport. (Boulda: Westvi.:w Pr.:ss. 1987) and .Iam<.!s A. 
Gn:gor. Land of the .\lorning Calm : Korea and .. Imerican Security. (Lanham: 
University Press of America. 1990). S<.!<.!. also. the author's C.S. Policy and the lim 
Koreas. (San Francisco & Boulder: World Affairs Council of Northern California & 
Westview Press. 1988) 
19 The author explored that course of action in the 1980s and early '90s in hi s '"Korean 
Sccurity: Is Japan's 'Comprehensive Security' Model a Viable Alternativ.:')'· in Doug 
Bandow and Ted Galen Carpenter. cds .. The US-South /(orerm Alliance. Time for a 
Change. (New Brunsw ick: Transaction Publisher. 1992). 
20 For useful overviews of nordpolitik and sports diplomacy's role in int.:r-Korean and 
U.S.-Korean contexts. see: Don Oberdorfer. The Two Koreas, A Contemporary History. 
(Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1997). 
21 For illustrative examples of late Cold War analyses that anticipated Cold War 
continuity as a context for future U.S.-ROK security relations. see: Harold C Hinton, cL 
al.. The US-Korean Secllrity Relationship. Prospects and Challenges for the 1 990s. 
(Washington. DC: Pergammon Brassey's. 1988). and Manwoo Lee. et. al.. Alliance 
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As a consequence. the end of the Cold ' War and collapse of the 
United States' main adversary was momentous for all of Korea. 
Obviously North Korea was far more traumatized by this turn of events 
than South Korea which was on the winning side and retained its ally 
intact, but Seoul also was compelled to adjust to the emerging post-Cold 
War security environment. The first decade of the post-Cold War era put 
South Korea in a somewhat ambivalent position. Because of the lingering 
remnant of the Cold War on the Korean peninsula. the U.S.-ROK security 
relationship exhibited a great deal of continuity that received considerable 
support from mainstream analysts, despite its anachronistic qualitiesY 
Concurrent with that bilateral continuity, South Korea pursued various 
forms of multilateralist options to expand upon its track record of 
diversificationY Helping this ambivalence avoid the perception of being 
contradictory, South Korea's brand of experimental multilateral ism was 
grounded on a foundation of U.S.-ROK bilateralism.2~ In these terms the 
U.S.-ROK alliance was widely deemed viable and the basis for continued 
cooperation well into the 21 st century.c5 
('nder Tension. The Emilltion of SOllth Korea-US. Relations. (Boulder : Westview 
I'r.:ss. 1988). 
22 For .:.\ampk. s.:.:: Young-\\han Kih!. .:d .. Korea and the /lii/·ld. Beyond the Cold War. 
(Boullkr: W.;stvi.:\\ Press. 1994). Robert Du.iarric. Korea.' Secllrity Pivot in :\'ortheast 
.-Isia. (Indianapolis: Hudson Institute. 1998). and Tong-whan Park. ed .. The C',s and 
the lil'O Koreas. (Boulder: Lynne Rienncr Publisher. 1998)_ 
23 For concrete c\ampks salicnt to the present topic. see: Victor Chao Alignment Despite 
Antagonism . US-Korea-Japon Security Trion!,le. (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
1999). and Ralph Cossa. (is'-Korea Japan Relations. Building Toward a . Tirtual 
.. lIliance." (Washington. DC: CSIS. 1999). For a broader set of analyses linked to the 
current ROK government. see: Democrati=ation and Regional Cooperation in Asia. 
(Seoul: Kim Dae-.iung Peace Foundation. 1996). 
24 For early post-Cold War assessments of that experiment. see: Lee Seo-hang. ed .. 
Evolving MIIltilateral Security Regime in Northeast Asia. Seoul: Institute of Foreign 
Affairs and National Security. 1994. 
25 For a thoughtful prescriptive analysis of those prospects. stemming from the U.S.-
ROK Security Consultative Meeting process, see: Jonathan D. Pollack and Young Koo 
Chao A :Vew Alliance For fhe ,vext Centllry.~ The Fllture of US-Korean Security 
Cooperation, (Santa Monica: RAND. 1995). 
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The launching of a new century and a new millennium 
combined to generate a sense of optimism with regard to continuity 
within the alliance. That was reinforced inadvertently by the events of 
September II, 200 I and their aftermath. Seoul's rhetorical and logistical 
support for the United States' efforts in the war on terrorism signaled 
South Korea's readiness to be perceived as an enthusiastic strategic 
partner for the United States. ~6 President Bush's controversial inclusion 
of North Korea as part of an "axis of evil" undoubtedly provoked South 
Korean consternation in the Kim administration because of the ways it 
detracted from President Kim's "sunshine policy" agenda,n but it also 
served to underline the ways the U.S.-ROK mutual security system can 
have contemporary resonance with implications for the future . 
Against this backdrop it is clear that conventional wisdom holds 
to the view that the U.S.-ROK security relationship remains important 
and is becoming even more important. Those who have argued in recent 
years for significant cuts in the U.S. commitment to South Korean 
security28 or that U.S. strategic commitments in Asia -- including South 
Korea -- can be counterproductive 29 clearly deviate from that 
conventional wisdom. In the present war or terrorism circumstances there 
is virtually no doubt that conventional wisdom's perceptions and 
26 For coverage of those steps. see: Oh Young-jin. "Kim VOI\ S Full Support for US .. ' The 
Korea Times. September 18. 200 I. p. I: Shin Young-bae. "Korea To Provide Non-
Combat Support to US .. ' lin' Korea Herald. September 25. 200 I. p. I: and Franklin 
Fi sher. "With Cargo Missions. S. Korea .loins lJ.s. War On Terrorism'" f'aci(ic Stars 
and Stripes. February 4. 2002. p. I. 
27 For coverage of his comment and n:actions to it. see: David E. Sanger. "In Speech 
Bush Calls Iraq. Iran and North Korea' An Axis of Evil' . The IVew lark Times . .Ianuar) 
30. 2002. p. I: John Larkin and Murray Hiebert. "Axis of Uncertainty'" Far Eastern 
Economic Review. February 14. 2002. pp. 12-15: and James Brooke. "South Korea and 
Japan Begin To Sweat After Bush Turns Up The Heat On North Korea'" The :\'elv lark 
Times. January 31. 2002. p. I. 
28 For prime examples. see: Doug Bandow. Tripwire. op. cit.. and Selig Harrison. "Time 
to Leave Korea')"" . op. cit. 
29 For a prominent example. see: Chalmers Johnson. Blowback The Costs and 
Conseqllences o/American Empire. (New York: Owl Books/Henry Holt. 200 I). 
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guidance shall prevail for the short-to-mid term. However, the 
perspective here is geared toward the second half century. That is an 
entirely different matter. What is deemed important today may well be 
transformed by shifting criteria and evolving contexts. A variety of 
contingencies is possible. 
One could postulate perpetuation of the strategic status quo, but 
that is unlikely to endure for the very long run because of the contextual 
pressures on North Korea. It is likely to sink or swim, not merely tread 
water. There are a number of circumstances that could lead to a greater 
North Korean threat that might well be seen in Seoul and Washington as 
justification for perpetuation of the security treaty well into its second 
half century -- perhaps beyond, into its second century. Although today 
North Korea 's socioeconomic prospects are quite bleak,30 this could 
turn around if the Pyongyang government got its act together. While most 
observers who consider that possibility to be plausible also deem it 
conducive to inter-Korean harmony, it might as readily yield a more 
formidable North Korean garrison state perpetuating its ability to threaten 
South Korea. While the latter is very unlikely, this prospect cannot be 
totally discounted. Even if North Korea is unable to reinvigorate itself 
geopolitically and merely plateaus, it might become relatively more 
dangerous were South Korea (rather than North Korea) to suffer a crash 
landing due to some unforeseen economic disaster. In short, were the 
balance of power between the two Koreas to shift adversely for South 
Korea due to either of these unlikely events, this could cause the U.S .-
ROK alliance 's resolve to be stiffened. Were that to occur, the alliance as 
it is presently configured is likely to be perpetuated. 
Putting those rather far-fetched scenarios aside, there are other 
more plausible ways that perceptions of North Korea's threat could 
increase over the years. Were U.S.-PRe relations to seriously sour due to 
30 For assessments of its situation and its meaning for U.S.-ROK interests. see: Marcus 
Noland. Avoiding the Apoca(}pse.· The Future of the Two Koreas. (Washington. DC: 
Institute for International Economics. 2000). and his "The Economic Situation in North 
Korea."' in Wonmo Dong. cd .. The Two Koreas and the United States. (Armonk: M.E. 
Sharpe. 2000). 
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their rivalries worsening, it is entirely plausible that North Korea would 
side closely with China. As long as South Korea takes the United States' 
side in any such tensions, that dynamic would add to U.S. motives to stay 
engaged in South Korea against a Sino-North Korean team. While there 
are ample reasons for the United States and South Korea to avoid such a 
rupture with China, it cannot be entirely discounted. Moreover, there is a 
significant cluster of American specialists in Chinese affairs who contend 
the United States will need to cope with a rising threat from China in the 
future.,J If they prove to be correct, this would provide an opportunity 
for South Korea to offer to help the United States deal militarily with that 
Chinese threat. Whether Seoul would deem that opportunity to be 
attractive is open to serious question . 
Another somewhat plausible possibility would involve North 
Korea learning the wrong lesson from President Bush's "axis of evil" 
phrase and developing a strategy predicated on a genuine "axis" of 
countries that feel threatened by U.S. readiness to act preemptively 
against them because of U.S. threat perceptions. Such an axis would be 
transformative in ways that clearly were not intended by President Bush's 
use of that term. This possibility -- and the harsh reactions it could 
provoke in the United States -- would be as unsettling for South Korea as 
a China-focused threat. It is highly unlikely that Seoul would want either 
of these scenarios to reach fruition as the means to perpetuate and 
enhance the U.S.-ROK security relationship for the out years. 
Yet another way that North Korea could loom larger as a threat 
in the future is if the United States managed to achieve a series of major 
strategic successes in various other sectors (i.e., peace in the Middle East, 
harmony in South Asia, and effectively coping with numerous terrorist 
entities), it is possible that North Korea -- weak or strong -- could loom 
larger in purely relative terms. Though possible, this too must be 
relegated to the fringes of twenty-first century geopolitics in terms of the 
31 For influential analyses of that issue. see: Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro. The 
Coming Conflict H'ith China. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996). and Thomas Metzger 
and Ramon H. Myers. eds .. Greater China and U.S Foreign Policy: The Choice Between 
Confrontation and MlItlla/ Respect. (Stanford: Hoover Institution. 1996). 
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likelihood of the United States really being that successful. Also, it is far 
from clear why South Korea would want to utilize such positive global 
circumstances to preserve a Korean Cold War relic rather than resolve it 
by nudging North Korea down the same path followed in these other 
situations and adding the Korean peninsula to the United States' 
successes. 
There are other, more realistic , scenarios in which the United 
States might well want to prolong its force presence in South Korea 
aimed at a continued North Korean threat -- and in this sense want to 
retain North Korea in that function rather than help to reduce or eliminate 
that role . They all have roots in existing U.S. interests as the fiftieth 
anniversary approaches. Despite the serious, perhaps catastrophic, 
qualities of North Korea 's ability to do damage to South Korea, Japan, 
and U.S. forces in both countries, there is a certain proactive utility in 
keeping a North Korean adversary in place . Although controversial , there 
is a strong case to be made that the United States benefits from North 
Korea' s existence by being able to use its threat potentials as a rationale 
or pretext -- depending upon one 's perspective -- for a range of U.S. anti-
proliferation programs and for the development of a national anti-missile 
capability. North Korea 's location on the PRe's border also is useful in 
that regard because it enables Americans to dwell on the North Korean 
threats rather than China's threats. In this sense North Korea provides 
cover for a broader set of U.S . policies focused on the PRC, but also 
constitutes highly believable plausible deniability with regard to U.S. 
intentions vis-a-vis China. Although American arguments on behalf of 
utilizing North Korea is such a manipulative manner are unlikely to be 
well received by the United States' South Korean security partners, those 
arguments may prove viable within the United States. 
Another,less controversial, rationale for indefinitely maintaining 
a U.S . security commitment to South Korea (and perhaps to a future 
unified Korea) is embedded within U.S. bureaucratic and budgetary 
politics. Compared to most of what the United States does strategically 
throughout the Asia-Pacific region which has a decidedly maritime flavor, 
dominated by the Navy and Marine Corps with sizable Air Force 
contributions, the U.S. Army's dominant role in Korea constitutes an 
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exception. This has consequences in terms of regional visibility, billets 
(including the only Army CINC in the region), and funding. Major U.S . 
force cuts or elimination in Korea would skew the regional balance 
among the U.S. service branches even more than it already is in favor of 
maritime and air power. As a consequence there are inter-service 
incentives to perpetuate the current mix indefinitely. As much as such 
incentives can matter on the U.S. side of the U.S.-ROK security 
relationship, future trends in South Korea -- and more likely in a unified 
Korea -- that could see Korea becoming more oriented toward maritime 
and air power in its national security might well undermine such U.S. 
bureaucratic reason ing. 
While there is an array of hypotheticals, with varying degrees of 
believability, that might well suggest the importance of the U.S.-South 
Korean security relationship will grow over the coming decades. there are 
others that are more contrarian . Foremost is the very real possibility that a 
North Korean threat will cease to exist. This could occur in a variety of 
ways. Most obviolls would be the abject collapse of North Korea due to 
an intensification of recent trends indicating economic decay that could 
well auger for soc ietal disintegration. Any development of that magnitude 
would mean the elimination of the Democratic People 's Republic of 
Korea (DPRK) as a state actor and the eradication of its ability to pose 
the threat that constitutes the central organizing principle behind the U.S. 
security commitment to South Korea. Something similar could occur 
through the evisceration of North Korea 's armed capabilities, in a 
lingering but economically wrecked DPRK, that would make it obvious 
that its threat potentials were a feeble echo of what once made it appear 
formidable . Another, and more optimistic variant, would entail the 
negotiated dissolution of the DPRK as part of successful peaceful 
reunification efforts. In all of these cases the brand of North Korean 
threat that today justifies a U.S. security commitment on the peninsula 
would no longer exist. 
To be sure, there are reasons used by some American analysts to 
advocate perpetuation of a U.S. force presence in Korea after unification 
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occurs (regardless of the interim collapse versus negotiations steps) that 
make a presentable argument.32 Such logic may prevail, but this seems 
unlikely for several reasons. In the wake of Korean reunification there is 
likely to be a strong sense of Korean national pride and nationalism that 
will not be particularly well disposed toward retaining any foreign armed 
forces on Korean soi I -- American or otherwise. U.S. forces may stay for 
a while to help bridge the gap, but the welcome mat is likely to wear out -
- in due course -- in the absence of a North Korean threat . In such 
circumstances the United States may hold Ollt a Chinese or Japanese 
threat as a substitute. Either may be plausible, but neither is I ikely to 
prove durable . China is more likely to be seen as threatening by 
Americans than by Koreans -- especially if Beijing plays a constructive 
role in helping to bring about Korean reunification or if Beijing strongly 
objects to the United States using Korea as part of some kind of U.S. 
containment policy aimed at China. This containment perspective by 
Beijing has grown as a result of U.S . efforts in Northeast, SOlltheast, 
South , and Central Asia that are partially linked to the war on terrorism.33 
Both sets of Chinese circumstances are very likely to influence adversely 
Seoul 's readiness to retain a U.S. force presence in Korea, especially 
amongst Koreans experiencing intensified nationalistic fervor. 
Using a possible Japanese threat to Korea might well be more 
plausible to Seoul as a strategic rationale for retaining U.S. forces in a 
unified Korea in the name of regional stability. South Korean anxieties 
about Japan's influence over U.S. pol icy are not new. 3~ Moreover, 
Japanese manipulative approaches to the strategic utility of a divided 
32 In addition to the items cited in Note 13. see : Michael O·Hanlon. "Keep U.S. Forces 
in Korea after Reunification:' The Korean JOllrnal of Defense Analysis. Summer 1998. 
pp. 5-19: William O. Odom. "The U.S. Military in Unified Korea." The Korean JOllrnal 
of Defense AnalYSis. Summer 2000. pp. 7-28; and Ralph Cossa, "The Role of U.S. 
Forces in a Unified Korea." International JOllrnal of Korean Stlldies. Fall/Winter 2001 , 
pp. 117-139. 
33 "China feels encircled:' The Economist. June 8. 2002. p. 39. 
34 For an early overview. see: .lames W. Morley. Japan and Korea .· America s Allies in 
the Pacific. (New York: Walker. 1965). 
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Korea are a source of South Korean concern.:;5 Those issues were 
magnified by the Clinton administration 's record to intensifying U.S.-
Japan security cooperation through the Nye Initiative .16 that raised 
Japan's profile relative to Korea's and caused Korean analysts to express 
greater anxieties :,7 All of this was compounded by the ways the United 
States' war on terrorism led to heightened Japanese readiness to 
cooperate militarily with the United States by lowering Japanese societal 
barriers to military activism' s and testing the waters of new options --
perhaps including the controversial nuclear option:w Cumulatively these 
factors enhance the plausability for Korea of a latent Japanese threat. 
However, this proposition would be a tough sell to the American public 
who would have to be persuaded why it is logical for the United States to 
perpetuate a U.S. force presence in two NOltheast Asian allies to deter 
them from being aggressive toward each other. That logic is unlikely to 
prevail in the absence of a useful surrogate for today 's North Korean 
threat to justify the United States' commitment to regional stability. 
American enthusiasm for persevering in the United States' 
strategic commitment to South Korea. o r to a unified Korea. may well be 
constrained by other factors as well. If one assumes -- as the Bush 
35 For usdul in sights. sec: Lee Chae-jin. ··U. S and Japanese Policies Toward Korean 
Unification" in Lee Chac-jin and Sato Hideo. cds .. ( · .. \-Japan PlIrll/ership ill Conjlict 
.lIanagement: The Case of Kort!a. (Claremont. CA : Keck Center lor International and 
Strategic Studies. Claremont McKenna Col k ge. 1993). and Michael II. Armacost and 
Kenneth B. Pyle. "Japan and the Unilication of (Korea: Challenges for U.S. Po licy 
Coordination." NBR , Inalysis. Vol. 10. No . 1. March 1999). Seattle : National Bureau of 
Asian Research . 
36 For a key insider 's perspectiye on that issue. see : Joseph Nyc. "As U.S . Defends Japan. 
Who's Being Served?" Christian Science Monitor. April 17. 1996. p. 19. 
37 For an example. see: Kim Tae-woo. "Japan's New Security Roks and RO K-J apan 
Relations." Korean Journal of Defense Analysis. Summer 1999. pp. 147-168. 
38 For coverage of Japan's responses to the war on terrorism. see: Kathryn Tolbert and 
Doug Struck. "Japan Expands Military Role to Support U.S .... Washington Post. 
October 19. 2001. p. 22: and David Lague. " The Japanese Military: New Rules of 
Oeknce." Far Eastern Economic Review. November I. 2001. pp. 20-21. 
39 Howard W. French. "N uclear Arms Taboo Is Challenged In Japan:' :Vew fork Times. 
Jun e 9.2002. p. I . 
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administration does -- that the United States' war on terrorism will be an 
open-ended commitment, there is every reason to believe the United 
States will have to confront adversaries in diverse sectors of the world . 
As long as North Korea remains part of the focus of the United States' 
strategic attention within this war, then it is safe to conclude that the U.S. 
commitment to South Korea will remain largely intact. However, if the 
North Korean threat ends -- as a result of its gradual or sudden collapse, 
its positive transformation through negotiations, or the regime's toppling 
as a result of direct U.S. preemptive action aimed at "axis" powers -- the 
resu lting lack of a North Korean adversary in one theater of the war on 
terrorism will eflectivel y transfigure the dynamic behind that aspect of 
the war. Why would the United States want to keep U.S. forces in a 
unified and stable Korea that could more logically be used in other 
theaters ofa prolonged war on terrorism? Arguably the United States may 
want to retain a United Korea as a partner in such a prolonged war, but it 
would be as a partner that accepts a mandate to bear responsibility for 
upholding its end of mutua l security by dispatching Korean forces to far 
flun g corners of the \<vorld in support of shared miss ions in a global anti-
terrorist coalition. In these circumstances U.S. forces would be pulled 
from a unified Korea to be used elsevvhere. perhaps fighting along s ide 
their Korean counterparts in an open-ended war on terrorism. American 
ardor today for all such activities in the war on terrorism shows no s igns 
of diminishing. It may well last as long as -- or longer than -- the Cold 
War. If so, then the United States' Korean allies should be prepared for 
heightened pressures for their strategic assistance outside Korea . 
Nonetheless , contemporary Koreans in South and North Korea -
- and in a future United Korea -- also need to contemplate the poss ibility 
that the American polity could someday produce an administration from 
the left or the right that would be reminiscent of past U.S. governments 
that were far less interventioni st in their foreign policies. It is poss ible 
that some future U.S. government would come from the successor to 
today's Ralph Nader - Pat Buchanan portion of the American political 
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spectrum.'O Were this to occur, Seoul had better have alternative security 
options in mind and be prepared to adapt to a major U.S. change of 
course. 
Similarly, the United States, too, should bear in mind the 
possibility that Korea 's world view could shift in dramatic ways. As 
noted above. were China to play a significant role in Korean 
reconciliation and reunification. the United States would have to adjust to 
the resulting level of Korean gratitude and deference toward Beijing. 
Depending on the nature of Sino-U.S. relations at that juncture. this could 
either be a simple adjustment to broadened U .S.-Korea-China relationships 
or it could evolve into a very awkward U.S.-Korean relationship in which 
the United States is at odds with China while its Korean ally tries to avoid 
getting caught in the geopolitical crossfire. 
Korea 's world vie\" also could be altered by broader phenomena. 
Were the cluster of countries constituting Korea's Asian context to pursue 
the nascent multilateralislll that characterizes the post-Cold War intemational 
system in the region. this might well alter Seoul's view of the importance 
of all U.S.-Korea bilateral ties -- including those on the security end of 
the relationship. The spectrum of possibilities is enormous, ranging from 
very limited forms of multilateralism to thorough-going institutionalized 
brands. The more limited it might be, the more likely it is that some form 
of U.S.-Korea bilateral security ties will persist as part of its foundation. 
However, were Asia to pursue an Asianized version of the European 
Union and NATO. the United States could find itself either marginalized 
or excluded -- depending upon the willingness of Asian countries to 
welcome the United States to their "club" and upon the United States ' 
readiness to participate in such an organization without being in the 
driver's seat. Interestingly, any of these multilateral regional outcomes 
could fit the descriptions outlined in the Security Treaty's preface. 
Against the backdrop of such speculation about the alternatives 
that the next half century could hold in store for either some variety of 
.to For insights into \\hat the Nader-Buchanan alt~rnatives to mainstream U.S, for~ign 
policy represent within U.S. society. see Nader's website (w\Vw.nader.org) and 
Buchanan' s \Vebsil~ (\\ W\I. thcamaicancausc,org), 
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continuity in U.S.-Korean security relations or some type of parting of the 
ways, it is advisable for both Seoul.J' and Washington to pay more 
careful attention to these possibilities and to not make unwarranted 
assumptions about the future. It would be eminently worthwhile for the 
responsible agencies in both the United States and South Korea to initiate 
planning that would address such alternatives . In the United States that 
would include both the Departments of State and Defense and in South 
Korea, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and National Defense . As these 
agencies, and their advisors, assess the alternatives within each country, 
they can devise a set of options and attendant scenarios that the United 
States and Korea are likely to pursue. Furthermore, to the extent possible, 
there should be an enhanced joint effort by the United States and South 
Korea to consult with each other and try to coordinate their respective 
policies . Such an approach may prove to be relatively smooth, but -- as 
some of the previously noted possibilities suggest -- there may well be 
unexpected potholes and detours in the road that lies ahead for the United 
States and Korea as they look toward what could be the second half 
century of their formal security relationship. 
If it does last that long, or longer, it will be best if Washington 
and Seoul work more closely together as decision-making partners than 
they often did during the first half century. And, equally important, if the 
security relationship is destined to change course in significant respects, 
that outcome -- in formats unknown today -- would be best implemented 
as the result of equally careful joint efforts. In either event, the national 
interests of the United States and Korea will be best served if both sides 
work together to facilitate the processes that shall shape their future . 
41 For a prominent South Korean scholar's insights into how the ROK should position 
itself for a volatile .. transitional" era. see: Rhe.: Sang-woo. "Kor.:a 's Strategic Options 
in the 21 st Century," Korea Focl/s. March-April 2002. pp . 51-58 (from the Spring 2002 
edition of .\eH· Asia). 
